A Preliminary Note on a Potential Synthesis of Bataille and Deleuze-Guattari

Expenditure is not the diametric opposite of production―expenditure cannot be forced into a binary opposition (it takes no opposition to anything, because for X to be in relation to a thing, X must too be a thing which expenditure is not (but let us note that zero erases the statement of ‘is not’ away because there is no negation found within expenditure, but at the same time expenditure is not positive affirmation (‘is not’ is washed away again) it is either the non-positive affirmation of Lyotard that Vitanza speaks of or it is that affirmation of affirmation which Blanchot speaks of (I’m sure it is probably more the latter if there is any difference between the two (but let us note that zero washes away the statement ‘it is’ like the ocean’s waves wash away a small child’s drawings which were in the sand of the beach shore)))). Expenditure is outside the binary of consumption and production and is in fact what constitutes it (it is the base matter which means it is not because it must be excluded by the fictional (but the restricted economy is in no way just a fiction) regime of the restricted economy, but we must note that the infected part of the restricted economy is productive consumption and it is a contagious subject which infects the rest of the economy, and then all subjects eventually die (productive consumption stops being productive, and in that movement, it stops being)). The general economy is on the level of the universe which means it excludes nothing (not even the excluded middle (which is base matter)). The restricted economy is not “real” like the general economy is, but before I say what I want to say, I must take into consideration what Nietzsche has said about the split between appearance and the real. Firstly, what I want to say is a conflation of the phenomenal world to the restricted economy and then the noumenal world to the general economy, but can I do this after seeing what Nietzsche said? Nietzsche is right when he says that there is no split between the real and appearance because the thing-in-itself is neither in-itself nor is it. Nietzsche is right when he says that it is nothing, but let us not take recourse to the negative (that is, the theological and occidental conception of negation), but to the NEGATIVE (that is, the atheological and base materialist (non-(?))conception of negation). Or in other words, thing-in-themselves are not nothing (we do not recourse into a pluralism) but rather NOTHING (we recourse into NOTHING but we cannot “recourse” into NOTHING because subjectivity ((teleological (productive)) action) is dissolved into NOTHING. The real is not (real?) because the real never is, that is, the real never takes on composition (it is the unprivileged scale?), it is pre-ontological libidinal chaos. The real is a hydraulic base-flow, Trieb, drive. But if it is death-drive then we have recourse to Freud (or do we?) which Deleuze and Guattari would not like… or would they? Let us look at Land’s schizoanalysis some other time. Some may say I do not know what I am talking about, that I drift away from the main subject too much into unknown areas. And they are right, I think that I know things, but all I know is that I know nothing because knowledge always leads to nonknowledge (= 0), and this operation-that-is-not(-an-operation) is materialism. I must say I have had an unfair predisposition against Deleuze and Guattari that stems from my Hegelianism and personal interactions with self-proclaimed Deleuzo-Guattarians, but I have met a few Deleuzo-Guattarians (e.g., Marko) who have an explicitly displayed joy in going into the unknown (this is a joy which can only be found in materialism). The energetic impulse towards zero found in these Deleuzo-Guattarians, as well as, deliberation with others (and, more importantly, with myself) has made me reconsider and dissolved this predisposition. I will try to set out a Deleuzo-Guattarian-Bataille synthesis (I have already done a critique of Deleuze and Guattari’s very anti-Hegelian conception of desire, but I want to reconsider my critique of Deleuze and Guattari as it has made some Deleuzo-Guattarians reconsider their own beliefs (identities)). Here I must say that I no longer want to continue my subscription (though I don’t believe I ever subscribed) to identity, that is, to belief. I never was a Bataillean. I must disagree with some of my first words I wrote on Bataille. I must go contrary to them and say that one cannot be a Bataillean. One can only catch “Batailleanism” as a disease while they are not, that is, in ‘the event’ (in the Lyotardian sense) of expenditure (thus, Batailleanism (base materialism) has been displayed (but it, therefore, hasn’t been displayed because expenditure is that unproductive consumption of signs which disrupts semiocapitalism and its systems of semiotic control as I have called them in my essay on an attempt (and it was a successful one!) at creating a Bataillean theory of semiocapitalism) in my writing, which is not writing at all, whenever expenditure dissolves that which is into the terrifying chaos that repels (because we are blind) and attracts us (because we desire to be blind, to be heterogeneous, to see with our pineal (third) eye (just like we hear things (like a schizophrenic does) that aren’t there with our third (“pineal”) ears) which is the Night!). But back to whatever I was talking about (I don’t even know what that is). Now, before I get to what I was talking about (note that we will never arrive there (this ocean which our voyage into the unknown is taking place (though it is not taking place because it is not) upon is the impossible)) I want to bring something up: contradiction. You may say that what I am saying is nonsense. I would agree. You may say that what I am saying is illogical, that it contradicts itself. I would agree. There is no issue here though (for me at least) because I do not subscribe to identity which is nothing but exclusion (a practice of the homogeneous and pure heterogeneous (we are radically and impurely heterogenous)), that is, identity is nothing but that theological and occidental negation which we do not recourse to. There is only zero (atheology). Even logic must be wasted, as Land and Vitanza would say. Some (e.g., Amar) would say that this is mysticism, that my recourse ((re(?))voyage) (in)to nonknowledge (which is beyond the capturing clutches of the discursive) is the act of a mystic. And just like Sartre, they would be wrong (because they are right?). What is happening is not mysticism because mysticism is still ordered, it is still too ordered. What is happening is not mysticism, it is inner experience. What I am doing here is probably what Vitanza would call ‘rhetoric’ (which I hesitate to conflate with inner experience, so do this for yourself if you like, but i will stay “agnostic” on the issue as of the time I write this), which is an operation of undoing (so, it isn’t an operation at all?). But I will save this for another essay (this is not true, I most definitely will not accumulate but expend the content of that in this essay (whatever ‘that’ is (I can’t seem to remember))). Writing is something that is not always ordered and when it isn’t ordered it isn’t writing. Writing isn’t rhizomatic, in this sense, it is the writing of a text which is that paroxysm that is the series of exchanges between chaos and composition. My writing embarrasses me. It gives me a burning feeling which is that feeling of embarrassment (I suffer this as a disease), but I write anyway… I don’t avoid this uncomfortableness. You too must suffer my ramblings as a burning disease. My past issue with Deleuze and Guattari was their claim that the subject is not fixed and if it is fixed then it is only because of repression, as well as, their very productivist theory of desire. I was under the influence of Bataille. But is that what I was really under? Was I really under the influence of Bataille, or did I mistake Bataille for Hegel (if I did Amar celebrates). Lastly (there never is an end, this is just a stop on the energy path), when looking at Victor J. Vitanza’s magnum opus Negation, Subjectivity, and the History of Rhetoric, one may argue that Vitanza doesn’t actually escape negation because he is excluding exclusion. But this would be a strawman. Vitanza only is following Nietzsche, Bataille, Lyotard, and Land in the movement (which is not a movement at all (in the sense that it does not have a telos)) that is non-positive affirmation. He never actually excludes exclusion, because when one excludes exclusion, they are immediately including (and therefore never actually excluding) exclusion. Vitanza is not tainted with negation because negation in the theological and occidental sense can never taint. It is too pure and ideal for that…