A Reassessment of Our Task Pertaining to the Logocentric Predicament

Our epistemic principles are finite in number; like the inhabitants of a small hamlet, they cannot take in each other’s epistemic laundry more than a few times without creating a circle. Faced with this problem we cannot simply suspend belief, for this would mean suspending all beliefs, and that is not only practically unfeasible but also self-defeating.

— Timothy McGrew and Lydia McGrew, Internalism and Epistemology: The Architecture of Reason, p. 126

Professor Timothy McGrew is quite correct that “deduction cannot be ‘credentialed’ by a derivation of its reliability from any independently certifiable source of beliefs; even God could not do better than an epistemically circular justification of deduction” (Internalism and Epistemology, p. 127). Presuppositionalism fails. This whole idea of grounding being the same as justification is without, ironically, basis or grounding in such (it may be the case that ontological instantiation within my neo-Fichteanism suffers from the same issue).


  • Theists will agree with us about direct acquaintance and non-inferenital justification in that they believe they have divine revelation. But, we could argue (this follows from what Erik and I talked about over the phone) that all entity’s that have direct acquaintance with something has understanding of it, but they are only justified in believing in it if they use a logical connective. For example, if I say I understand that God has revealed himself to me, then we could just chill with that, but in doing so we would only have a tautology, and nothing more. Therefore, one must say, I have direct acquaintance with the fact that God has revealed himself to me, therefore I know God exists. The non-inferential justification of inference making and the laws of logic is contained in the direct acquaintance with and thus understanding of what the logical connective “therefore” does (not what it is supposed to do; people will argue that the goal of “therefore” is to be the expression of inference making but this is a strawman that is only put forward with the intent to obfuscate the debate), and what it is does is express an inference being made. [elaborate on this] — — ultimately, what is demonstrated is that to move beyond tautology one must employ the laws of logic, therefore meaning the laws of logic are the basis of all synthetic knowledge (as analytic statements are what we are directly acquainted with) — — knowledge of the existence of God is synthetic, therefore we can deny the existence of God through logical critique, or, on the other hand, prove the existence of God through logical deduction.
  • Respond to this: https://pushingtheantithesis.blogspot.com/2021/06/against-autonomy-response-to-david.html
  • The objection this article makes that argues that direct acquitance is an action therefore implying time obviously supposes a theory of action, an idea of moving from state or another. Furthermore, the objection that David supposes the uniformity of perceptual experiences refers to there being different states of affairs (hence the possibility of the destruction of uniformity arises), but again does this not suppose temporality, or, rather, that time is always instantiated outside the mind — — it seems that if we can use post facto explanation in regards to a idealist theory of time, we can solve this issue
  • He then argues that “perceptions without prior concepts are unintelligible” and David therefore supposes a certain structure of the mind (such as Kant and Rand do) and therefore theory of the mind.
  • He also says that David supposes his own existence (this is the most pressing presupposition we have to address, maybe use the Hegelian subject self-causation thing)
  • Respond to the egocentric predicament (internalism may contain a preemptive response)
  • Any justification of logic is going to have to be non-inferential
  • Let’s note that a solution to the logocentric predicament (and getting past this whole problem of deduction) will save rationalist philosophy completely (assuming we don’t appeal to experience for our solution, but as we have gone over in the past, any attempt that appeals to experience will not be able to solve it)
  • It seems that a combination of internalism, foundationalism, theories of non-inferential justification, and rationalism will all be employed in order to solve the logocentric predicament
  • The possible parody arguments coming out of our internalist solution to the logocentric predicament can be addressed through logic without circularity being the case, as parody arguments aren’t giving actual objections to the framework being proposed, rather parody arguments are trying to test the faith of the proposer in their proposed framework (do note that since we are without faith but rather reason in our belief and knowing, then we will not be susceptible to such arguments)
  • Internalism as a refutation to Bataille’s theory of nonknowledge? (The final refutation of Bataille — -I’ve come full circle!)
  • Don’t fall into this dogma of “I am reasonably justified in believing in x” because that would beg the question of reason’s validity, which is a whole mess that doesn’t need to be entered into
  • Are action-based solutions actually solutions when compared to theory-based solutions; Fichte, for example, gives an action-based solution the issue of proving the principles of identity and non-contradiction; for more on the idea of action-based solutions, see A Priori Skepticism, Conventionalism and Contextualism by Sherif Mohamed Gamal Salem



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Evan Jack

Evan Jack

How sweet terror is, not a single line, or a ray of morning sunlight fails to contain the sweetness of anguish. - Georges Bataille