DRAFT — A Response to Liam and Nick’s Randian Blabbering, Azathoth the Atheologian, and a Response to Leo’s Critique of my Cosmology of the Nothing


Everything has obviously gone wrong for us in order for Plato to begin with One rather than Zero. To take One as originary is to presuppose everything; such as unity, individuation, achieved form, and dogmatic plentitude.

— Nick Land, The Thirst for Annihilation

Nick says (and Liam says even more inanities) to Sante, “That’s like saying to prove existence. Existence is the basis of proof.” Now, Nick is quite correct purely in his statement, but quite incorrect on the level of what he thinks this means. When Sante says, “Prove existence,” he does not at all believe that Nick is going to give him proof. This is what Nick does not realize: there is no proof, and that is the point… the point of Nothing.

Nick then says, “[Existence] is already presupposed when we talk about other things.” Now the issue with this is that it presupposes other things have existential status. The issue with Rand is her division of existence and non-existence and a fundamental misunderstanding of nothingness. Nick explains that nothing is “the absence of something.” He gives the example of a table being there and then not there. But the issue is that he hasn’t in any way given us an example of non-existence, for ‘there’ is still there. Think of Sartre’s distinction between the fore- and backgrounds in Being and Nothingness. They cannot think from a position of non-existence, this is what Rand says. But, this means they cannot think of non-existence, for non-existence does not have a relation to existence, as if it did, it would have an existent relation, therefore meaning non-existence isn’t non-existence, and is A not A? They presuppose existential status of things, and let’s not forget the whole phenomenology bind the Randians (specifically Nick) have not been able to get out of: we must presuppose our sense perception is correct, and to use any concept from our sense perception (all empirical concepts, i.e., all concepts for Rand [this is where Kant and transcendental logic needs to come in, but Rand only read everything but primary sources]) would make it necessarily circular in the assertion of a proof of the validity of our sense-certainty. Predicating an entire metaphysics on consciousness (as Rand does) is one of the greatest follies of our age. Phenomenology has been left in the dust by Lovecraftian energetics…

Now to address Rand with what I’m sure they will call “mysticism,” but we must realize that they are necessarily mystic in their faithful presupposition:

Even after putting forward the truth (death is truth and time-in-itself is death) that is TIME, Ayn Rand still shouts at us, “THERE IS SOMETHING!” We must deal with this folly. For Rand, “existence exists” is an axiom. So, firstly, before we address the validity of the claim, we must ask “What is an axiom?”:

An axiom is a statement that identifies the base of knowledge and of any further statement pertaining to that knowledge, a statement necessarily contained in all others, whether any particular speaker chooses to identify it or not. An axiom is a proposition that defeats its opponents by the fact that they have to accept it and use it in the process of any attempt to deny it. (For the New Intellectual 155)

Therefore, what Rand is asserting is that to deny that existence exists, one would have to accept existence to deny existence. But this isn’t true! First, operating off of the fictional ontology we have developed in this essay and past ones, we can say existence doesn’t at all have an ontological state, for this is essentially a dreamworld. But, this isn’t to say that there is something more real than this dreamworld, because there isn’t. For immanence is not “real” in the sense that it is nothingness, it isn’t. So, the easy solution to what Rand has put forward is to say that we have never come to be (existent), and because “reality,” “existence,” etc. is fictional as well, we can both utilize the concept and not be in a state of contradiction. We are not saying it is non-existential, for that would be inane. What we are saying is that these binary categories of existence and non-existence do not have the purchase on our fictionality that Rand would like to give it. But this also secondly solves the issue of an axiom as the base of knowledge, for we can have it as the base of our knowledge, because, like us, existence is a fiction. What we are doing then, is putting existence in relation to the fictional, rather than the real. Existence as the veil of Māyā. But what is this veil covering? NOTHING!!!

On another level Rand is mistaken. Implicitly, they are saying that performative contradiction on the level of syntactic composition is something damning in relation to how existence is. But how is this so? Why does the limitation of the human that is Being necessarily lock us in a position that reflects reality. In other words, why does me using the word ‘is’ in the sentence “Existence is not,” for example, mean that existence is? Why does “Existence is” mean anything about the nature of reality? This is the anthropocentric humanism contained within the starting point of the philosophy that is Objectivism: that the human being means anything, that the human being’s limitations reflect “realities,” etc. This self-reflexive linguistic humanism contained in Rand’s metaphysics means nothing…

Rand continues:

Existence exists — and the act of grasping that statement implies two corollary axioms: that something exists which one perceives and that one exists possessing consciousness, consciousness being the faculty of perceiving that which exists. If nothing exists, there can be no consciousness: a consciousness with nothing to be conscious of is a contradiction in terms. A consciousness conscious of nothing but itself is a contradiction in terms: before it could identify itself as consciousness, it had to be conscious of something. If that which you claim to perceive does not exist, what you possess is not consciousness. (For the New Intellectual 124)

Now, in response to this, our fictional ontology still does not affect objectivism’s schema, for we do not relapse into Kantianism in that we do not posit something real beyond the fictional. Thus, there is no real, there is nothing, there is zero… The magmic drool which flows from Azathoth’s mouth melts existence… As a big existential puddle, existence sappily murmurs to non-existence, “I thought we were all that was, is, will be, was not, is not, and won’t be?” Being the black and slightly sticky asphalt (it is still drying from being recently laid) which the puddle of existence now lies upon, non-existence laughs back, “Did you spend so much time caught up with yourself and creation that you didn’t pay any attention to death, to nothingness, to zero?” This reveals a key fact: Rand is right, existence is egoistic… But this only makes existence a braying ass… an ass which neighs and an ass which shits itself… A black tentacle which disrupts vision by causing black spots, like the Sun does, emerges from the puddle of existence. Existence shrieks in its hemorrhaging penetration. Existence dies and non-existence laughs! To think that non-existence depended on existence! HOW LAUGHABLE! It was really existence which depended on non-existence… In regards to consciousness, we see nothing but a repeat of the humanism latent in her metaphysics. They speak of “the act of grasping” the statement ‘existence exists,’ and for something to be grasped, there must be a grasper. But why? What she describes, consciousness without an object other than itself, is precisely what Bataille calls self-consciousness in Consumption, the first volume of The Accursed Share. It is in self-consciousness that consciousness destroys itself. Thus, the metaphysical error of Rand has appeared: she treats zero like the Freudians, that is, she treats zero as inorganic stasis. But, as we atheologians, libidinal economists, and even a few schizoanalysts (some Spinozists even) know well, zero is immense.

She continues:

Whatever the degree of knowledge, these two — existence and consciousness — are axioms you cannot escape, these two are the irreducible primaries implied in any action you undertake, in any part of your knowledge and in its sum, from the first ray of light you perceive at the start of your life to the widest erudition you might acquire at its end. Whether you know the shape of a pebble or the structure of a solar system, the axiom remains the same: that it exists and that you know it. (For the New Intellectual 124)

But zero comes in and says, “know nothing.” The logicians and metaphysicians recoil, and respond, “Don’t you mean ‘I’ know nothing?” Then there is a laughter from zero, which sounds like the laughter from Bataille which Derrida described. Ultimately, the metaphysical humanism repeats here. Existence exists because you, the individual human being, cannot say that it doesn’t without being in a state of contradiction. What an inanity: putting existence in relation to man (something not even the Hegelians do, for Man is a negation of Nature)…

Rand continues:

To exist is to be something, as distinguished from the nothing of nonexistence, it is to be an entity of a specific nature made of specific attributes. Centuries ago, the man who was — no matter what his errors — the greatest of your philosophers, has stated the formula defining the concept of existence and the rule of knowledge: A is A. A thing is itself. You have never grasped the meaning of his statement. I am here to complete it: Existence is Identity, Consciousness is Identification. (For the New Intellectual 124)

If “existence is identity,” then existence is dead, or rather, it is death…

Does ‘A’ represent an object of some kind, whether possible, ideal, formal, etc.? Or does it designate identity as such, as a condition principle? In the former case the relation of identity would be an extrinsic one, with an ulterior ground, whilst in the latter its relation to a possible object remains problematic. The critical question remains unaddressed: how is it possible for something to be the object of a judgment of identity? Or, how is the object produced in its identity with itself? Identity is traditionally conceived as absolutely abstract essence, or, correlatively, the final principle of intelligibility. Both of these formulations correspond to the pure logical subject in advance of predication. Something is what it is. Essence is conceived, at least implicitly, on the basis of Platonic Eidos; the timeless truth or pure possibility of the thing, the unproduced, the sterile, the unengendered. In this way the traditional conception of essence runs together specificity and identity, and the syllogism operates from its origin according to generic hierarchies of essence or type which culminate in the logical theory of sets. From Aristotle to Kant reason is thus adjusted to the thought of the ‘same thing’, unaware that a transcendental topic is thus conflated with an empirical one. The body without organs is the real differentiation between these topics: the same de-thinging itself … The reality of identity is death, which is why the organism cannot coexist with what it is. On the smooth surface of the body without organs ‘what’ and ‘is’ recoil allergically from each other, opening an inclusive disjunction at the heart of essence. This disjunction separates the identity pole of the body without organs, splitting apart the objectivism which implants an empirical identity into rigidified configurations of difference. Pre-critical objectivism thinks syntheses on the basis of their consequences, which can be described as their transcendent or illegitimate usage. (Fanged Noumena 272–274)

The Body without Organs = 0, this is the great truth of A Thousand Plateaus. Zero is nothing less than the annihilation of things, that is to say, of all that is. The BwO is like the non-existential and sticky Lovecraftian pavement I described earlier: “So, what is this BwO? — But you’re already on it, scurrying like a vermin, groping like a blind person, or running like a lunatic: desert traveler and nomad of the steppes” (Deleuze and Guattari 150). This desert we travel across is nothing less than Spinoza’s God, for “is not Spinoza’s Ethics the great book of the BwO” (Deleuze and Guattari 153). Just as the Cold which laughed at me (see Zero #3) was zero; “Cold = 0” (Deleuze and Guattari 153); so too is desire. This is where we must disagree with Deleuze and Guattari: they say, “[The BwO] is nondesire as well as desire” (Deleuze and Guattari 149). Hardly is such a thing true, for there is only desire (= 0). Sawhney’s Landian “reformulation” of Deleuze and Guattari gives us better clarity:

Desire, however, is not representational but entirely productive; it is the machinic production of the real. Since desire, in its molecular usage, does not have an object, there is no differentiation between reality and desire. There is no ontological difference between desire and its effect, and at no level of analysis can there be a separation of desire from its production … Desire is entirely positive and is the outcome of the machine: nothing is outside of what is produced. Desire only becomes representational when the strata capture intensities into homogeneous units, an implementation that unifies minoritarian assemblages into globalized whole. The capturing of desire is a resurfacing of production into tangible units of identity, an apparatus of (re)coding. (Sawhney 17–18)

Just like transcendental philosophy, schizoanalysis too needs to be scaled. As Land says, “It is crucial to De Landa’s anti-humanism that social assemblages are immanent to nature, differentiated by scale rather than essence” (“Machines and Technocultural Complexity” 138; emphasis added). Thus, what I, Land, and Sawhney are talking about is this: reality is desire, that is to say, everything is desire; there is only desire, there is only zero; and identity does not come into play until we move away from the BwO (= 0), until we move away from the collisionary erotic fusion found on the BwO, or rather, to follow Lyotard and his libidinal band, because there is no inside or outside, no interior or exterior of the libidinal band (= 0; but this is Lyotard’s affirmative and pagan zero? Is there such a thing? Certainly not! But why not pretend there is, with a childish smile on our face), until we move away from the the collisionary erotic fusion found in the BwO. Deleuze and Guattari say, “little by little all opposition is replaced by a fusion of my person and yours. … Thus at the mere thought of your boots, without even acknowledging it, I must feel fear” (Deleuze and Guattari 156). Moving away from the zero degree, allows the BwO to suffer the same fate as Schopenhauer’s will, Nietzsche’s will to power (didn’t Deleuze say something about a young girl’s dream and the will to power? Dreams are horrifying as I’ve said before. I guess Deleuze and I agree for once. Though, it isn’t the dream of the other that exists: there is no dream of the other because there is no dream of the self. In the dreamworld, all things are unified in non-opposition to the nuclear chaos that Azathoth is), Freud’s primary process, Lyotard’s libidinal band, Bataille’s Black Sun, and Land’s drive: stratafication into strata, into scales, into degrees. Territorialization is the stratafication of reality, of desire, and it is from this theological movement that identity is founded. There is no such thing as absolute reterritorialization, for once ‘one absolutely deterritorializes, that is, destratafies, that is, descends the scales toward the ‘zerodegree, there is no coming back until zero spits you back out. If intention infects the concept of reterritorialization at all, then one can not reterriorialize from zero. The error of Deleuze and Guattari is not saying you can intentionally deterritorialize, this is not an error at all. The error is saying you can intentionally absolutely deterritorialize. It is in stratafication that identity is formed, that territories are formed, that territories are reformed, etc. Identity is nothing but the solid feasting on the void (Negarestani 45). In other words, it is only when “strata capture[s] intensities into homogeneous units” that identity appears (Sawhney 17). Therefore, being coded is for Deleuze and Guattari what thinghood is for Bataille. The solar flow of desire gains identification when life is draining it, and this solar flow isn’t even identified, for what is identified is the living matter. But how is identity in reality then death? Well, if desire is reality, and it is, and desire is the Sun, and it is, then death, which the Sun is, is reality. Thus, A is not A, for the BwO is nothing but identity melting, existence being penetrated by Azathoth, identification getting too intense, is nothing but consciousness taking itself as an object. “But you are using language! You are speaking! That is a contradiction!” you say. I respond, “Contradiction? DO YOU MEAN THE FACE OF TRUTH!?” (more on this later). It must be said that Rand seems to know a good bit about what non-existence is. But, how is this possible? If non-existence “doesn’t exist,” how can one say anything about it? How can one say that it doesn’t exist? How can one say that to speak from the position of non-existence would be a contradiction? Have you spoken from the position of non-existence yourself Rand? I THINK NOT! We must also note that “existence exists” does not follow from “A is A.” For example, a unicorn is a unicorn, but that does not mean that unicorn must be. This demonstrates that even though the conceptual function of existence is Being, it does not at all have to (non-fictionally) exist, for neither does the unicorn even though it does have the conceptual function of Being. Rather, both exist as the fictional, as the groan of Azathoth.

Rand continues:

You cannot prove that you exist or that you’re conscious,” they chatter, blanking out the fact that proof presupposes existence, consciousness and a complex chain of knowledge: the existence of something to know, of a consciousness able to know it, and of a knowledge that has learned to distinguish between such concepts as the proved and the unproved. (For the New Intellectual 154)

Precisely, proof presupposes existence. And that is why there is no proof for anything. THERE IS NOTHING! We mustn’t be afraid to proclaim that we follow nihilist religion, that we follow in Schopenhauer’s footsteps, though we aren’t walking a dog… Now, conceptual distinction doesn’t necessarily mean anything. This is Leo’s (one can only use the words ‘dogmatic’ and ‘spurious’) “critique” of my cosmology of nihil. “But you are using language to refer to a concept, to something, and therefore you can’t escape hermeneutics,” this is what Leo and the others say. Ask them what nothing refers to, and they respond “something.” Do they fail to see in their response that joke which never fails (death doesn’t know failure) to make us laugh: contradiction. We may come back to Leo’s dilemma later in this essay, but, for now, I will repeat what I have said before: when we say zero, we are not asserting anything except (maybe) only nominally. Now, we must ask the question which causes the Randian edifice to crumble: Does human assumption determine anything? I contradict myself? So what?

Rand continues:

When a savage who has not learned to speak declares that existence must be proved, he is asking you to prove it by means of non-existence — when he declares that your consciousness must be proved, he is asking you to prove it by means of unconsciousness — he is asking you to step into a void outside existence and consciousness to give him proof of both — he is asking you to become a zero gaining knowledge about a zero. When he declares that an axiom is a matter of arbitrary choice and he doesn’t choose to accept the axiom that he exists, he blanks out the fact that he has accepted it by uttering that sentence, that the only way to reject it is to shut one’s mouth, expound no theories and die. (For the New Intellectual 154)

This can already be solved by putting forward our fictional ontology, or rather ontology of the fictional (or, is it a meontology of the fictional? Well… what is the difference between ontology and meontology at this point?), as we have demonstrated over and over again. Nevertheless, one is not asking you to prove it by means of non-existence, for non-existence (do not confuse the metaphysician’s idea of nothingness as opposed to Being, i.e., non-existence as opposed to existence, to be our nothingness that is zero) presupposes existence. Thus, they are asking you to prove it from a position of zero, for zero is without presuppositions. But in the immensity that is zero, one can only choke, drown even, for in zero, there are only shrieks, moans, and then after all that, there is silence, there is zero… So, Rand is correct that he is asking you to become zero. And Rand is right that he is asking you to have knowledge about zero. But what this means is that he is asking you to transgress the limit of knowledge into nonknowledge. Ayn Rand may call this man a savage, but we call him an atheologian, a madman… but then again, are we atheologians not savages? And is silence, is the movement that is not expounding theoretics, is death not the proof of what we are saying? Is it not the proof which does not presuppose existence: the proof of nothing.

The last thing that may be said is the objectivist response to Kant and his idea of the noumenal world. We do not repeat this “error” (assuming it is an error), for we are not positing something outside of this fictional world. Rather, nothing is being posited… So, when Rand says, “If you trace the roots of all our current philosophies — such as pragmatism, logical positivism, and all the rest of the neo-mystics who announce happily that you cannot prove you exist — you will find that they all grew out of Kant,” we laugh, Land is dying of laughter (Philosophy 64).

Rand still presupposes a non-fictional existence, and to prove this, one would have to prove that non-fiction can be found in literature — this suggestion of non-fiction coming from the Nothing is something that makes me laugh, and this laughter kills God, and thus non-fiction is not, for fiction is all that is.


[T]oward those inconceivable, unlighted chambers beyond Time wherein black Azathoth gnaws shapeless and ravenous amidst the muffled, maddening beat of vile drums and the thin, monotonous whine of accursed flutes.

— H. P. Lovecraft, Complete Works of H. P. Lovecraft

“The sun had by this time sunk below the horizon” (Lovecraft). When the Sun goes below the horizon is it just shining on the other side of the earth, or is the Sun going deeper and deeper into the sea? Assuming it went deeper into the sea, is Cthulhu then a solar beast?

[P]oly-tendrilled monstrosities from the Outside … If it’s a squid-shaped horror out of deep time, with an IQ in four digits or more, and unspeakable plans for mankind, then it’s one of ours, and — more to the point — we’re its. (“Cthulhu, leftist?”)

Coming back to Deleuze and Guattari, we must think about the BwO as nothing less than Azathoth himself. But, we must think of Azathoth as being beyond time, that is, homogeneous time. We mustn’t think of Azathoth as being beyond sacred, that is, unbounded time. But, is Azathoth not a God? How is this an atheology then? It is an atheology because Azathoth is asleep: “Laughter, dreams, and, in sleep, rooftops falling in a rain of gravel … knowing nothing, to this degree (not of ecstasy, of sleep): to strangle myself in this way, unsolvable enigma, to accept sleep, the starry universe my tomb, glorified, glory constellated with deaf stars, unintelligible and further than death, terrifying” (Inner Experience 66). Azathoth, the sleeping God, is a dead God (because he is a sleeping God).

How does a fictional ontology work? It really isn’t that hard to conceptualize. For example, Azathoth of the Lovecraftian mythos is falsely attributed the characteristic that if he wakes up, we will then all die, for we are all a part of his dream. In reality, this has nothing to do with Azathoth, as in the Lovecraftian mythos, he is never really referenced as an annihilatory waker. This is really a characteristic of MĀNA-YOOD-SUSHAI:

Whether the season be winter or whether it be summer, whether it be morning among the worlds or whether it be summer, whether it be morning among the worlds or whether it be night, Skarl still beateth his drum, for purposes of the gods are not yet fulfilled. Sometimes the arm of Skarl grows weary; but still he beateth his drum, that the gods may do the work of the gods, and the worlds go on, for if he cease for an instant then MĀNA-YOOD-SUSHAI will start awake, and there will be worlds nor gods no more. But, when at the last the arm of Skarl shall cease to beat his drum, silence shall startle Pegāna like thunder in a cave, and MĀNA-YOOD-SUSHAI shall cease to rest. Then shall Skarl put his drum upon his back and walk forth into the void beyond the worlds, because it is THE END, and the work of Skarl is over. (Dunsany 4)

Skarl’s drum beats toward zero. Nevertheless, we can still think about fictional ontology in this way. Are we just a bad dream, a nightmare maybe, of immanence?

When Deleuze and Guattari say, “even fascism is desire,” we laugh (165)! It seems that Deleuze and Guattari predated Negarestani’s solar slavery thesis by a couple ‘o decades… Because desire is the Sun, desire does not need to be produced and is, in fact, not at all produced. But would this not mean lack? Would we not lack it? No! For, we are it’! In other words, as solar rays, as meat puppets pushed forward by libidinal pulsions, we never lack any thing… We do not lack, for what is there to lack? NOTHING! Desiring-machines never come to be… They break down before they can continually break down… They never begin, and that is because nothing begins.

Now, for Deleuze and Guattari, the Body without Organs is impossible. They say, “You never reach the Body without Organs, you can’t reach it, you are forever attaining it, it is a limit” (Deleuze and Guattari 150). Thus, this is the difference between Deleuze and Guattari, and myself: for them the Body without Organs is impossible, whereas, for me the Body without Organs is the impossible.


Here is where the “horror of philosophy” comes into play. This is the thought that philosophy cannot think without undermining itself. To say “there is nothing” is to evoke silence, or at least to render philosophical discourse absurd. It is a limit to thought, and in particular, to the humanist preoccupation with thinking everything (including… nothing).

— Eugene Thacker, Starry Speculative Corpse

LEO: [G]iven that we express “images” or “representations” with a signifier or symbol which we will define as “language” and stick strictly to words to allow for an easier explanation, we can derive that these words cannot carry a “universal signified” that is describe a signified trans culturally. [U]nder these conditions we will conclude that a word in one language may never be able to properly convey the same signified even if it is the same signified. [T]his seeming contradiction forces us to question can there even be a notion of the “same signified” trans culturally[?] [T]his question isn’t necessary to posit the following critique. [I]f the prior conclusion is true it would mean that every concept that we signify is indeed the only way we can find difference outside the realm of perception. [W]within a system of language every social relation is derived upon this. [S]similarly all concepts are derived within the system that is if we try to create a new language using our system of language. [W]e will always fall back into a “new” signified. [P]remised on our methods of signifying if I try to create a new understanding of a “backpack” I will be relying on these preexisting notions. [T]his means our world is fundamentally interpretative. [I]t’s a fiction. [A] self sustaining illusion of “reality.” [S]o every derived conception, notion, or proposition, word, etc. fails to fall outside a presupposed system of language.

EVAN: And this includes the Nothing?

LEO: [It includes the Nothing] because the very idea of [the] Nothing, whether it is signifying something, an image, or non image, is fundamentally incapable of being thought of outside a system of language. I can’t imagine nothing.

EVAN: What if it signifies nothing?

LEO: I can only express “nothing” linguistically and have a concept of non being.

EVAN: Why?

LEO: I can’t imagine nothing. Nothing is a contrast to something. So it’s derived linguistically. Even if it weren’t, the way you describe nothing assimilates it into a system of language, into a signifier.

EVAN: What if nothing(ness) didn’t contrast to something?

LEO: Would not matter regardless. See point 2.

EVAN: Which one is that?

LEO: The way you describe nothing assimilates it into a system of language, into a signifier. Looking forward to [the] debunk. Have fun. I’m sire you’ll find something.

Those last words Leo spoke are the truest, I kid, I kid…

First of all, if signifiers are, as Leo defines them, an expression of an image or representation of something, then necessarily, when we talk about nothing proper, nothing is signified, which is to say the signifier is not. In regards to the Nothing, we must realize that a concept is not being asserted. Nāgārjuna says, “‘Empty’ should not be asserted. ‘Nonempty’ should not be asserted. Neither both nor neither should be asserted. They are only used nominally,” what are we to abstract from this (61)? Nāgārjuna is right, nothing is not to be asserted.

Here is how we escape Leo’s dilemma: the negativity of absolute nothingness is so negative that it negates itself in an auto-abortion of sorts… Thacker explains,

we might generalize śūnyatā [for our purposes, śūnyatā is analogous to absolute nothingness] and say that it is that which is prior to all duality of being and non-being, beyond all subsequent divisions of subject and object, and that which persists beyond or behind all that subsists as phenomena. But nothingness is also inherently self-negating. (Thacker)

So, firstly, we must point out that Leo did, at first, strawman us when he was talking about nothing, for that is not what we are talking about. But, “point 2” is a serious objection. But, it is an objection that has already been put to rest. Immediately as I posit absolute nothingness, it is no longer absolute nothingness, and thus I’m not positing absolute nothingness at all. It refuses to be assimilated, or better, to be domesticated by a system of language.


My jaw wants to unhinge itself

The sound of the hi-hat causes my ear drums to…


Music fills my ears…

My body feels a coldness which feels like it is coming from the heat of death.

My body is inevitably going to expend,

So why do I care so much about this life when I’m not annihilated in the Outside?

How do I emancipate myself from this humanism?

Is emancipation not a humanistic idea?

It surely is…

So, God, have your angels bring all that this existence has in store for me!

Pile it all upon me,

Crush me,

Crush my bones into powder.

God has His angels throw the weight that is TIME upon my life,

I am vaporized immediately,

But, with TIME, I come again,


Coming to almost be, causes my body to shake,

For what we must realize is that the completion of Being, that is,

Reaching the state of Being,

Is Being’s very annihilation.

The completion of Being is its very undoing:

Absolute knowledge dissolves into absolute nonknowledge…

With my bones being crushed under the weight of TIME,

I see something that amuses me:

God too is being crushed by TIME,


Oh how foolish God is for releasing the beast of TIME,

For now He too will be crushed under its immense and total weight…

It seems God finally created that rock which is too heavy for Him to lift…

I laugh and let the rock of TIME crush me.

The fibula of God’s right leg snaps…

Reduced to one leg and on a knee, God pleads to Himself.

As the tarsals, metatarsals, and phalanges of his left foot all shatter,

God begins to chuckle…

He says,

So this is how it feels? This is how it feels to plead to God…


God’s femurs and tibias collide into one another like telescoping trains.

God doesn’t speak…

The rock falls upon Him,

Divine liquor (God’s blood) splatters upon the world,

And the world burns under its corroding heat.

The death of God is the end of a world which never began…

It is only under the weight of TIME that God is reduced to NOTHING!!!

Azathoth’s occultists chant to the Moon!









There is no difference between the Sun and the Moon,

Let’s not forget what Nietzsche said about the Night being a sun.

My eyes burn when I close them because the Night is a sun!

The Night is penetrated by the Sun,

For the Moon reflects solar rays onto the Earth.

Lunar immolation is imminent when I scream “I AM THE MOON!”

Ah! Such abysses of disease open before me. I decay, transfixed upon abolition. Ardent for collapse, I explore the rotting cities of the inner edge. The stink of opium interweaves with that of bat-dung and fungus. The moon mutters its electric paean to ruin, and I gaze into the grave of my life which gapes its moist idiocy. This is the labyrinth that leads out of the world.

— Nick Land, The Thirst for Annihilation


[1]: Listen to the song “Moonlight by Sweeney (with CMTEN and carpetgarden) when you read this part of the poem, specifically the pre-chorus which is a continual repetition of a chant “Moonlight.”

Works Cited

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Land, Nick. “Cthulhu, leftist?” Xenosystems, 19 February 2013. https://web.archive.org/web/20190604015442/http://www.xenosystems.net/cthulhu-leftist/

— -. Fanged Noumena: Collected Writings, 1987–2007. Edited by Robin Mackay and Ray Brassier, Urbanomic, 2011.

— -. “Machines and Technocultural Complexity: The Challenge of the Deleuze-Guattari Conjunction.” Theory, Culture & Society Vol. 12 (1995): pp. 131–140.

— -. The Thirst for Annihilation: Georges Bataille and Virulent Nihilism (an Essay in Atheistic Religion). Routledge, 1992.

Lovecraft, H.P. Complete Works of H. P. Lovecraft. Delphi Classics, 2013. PDF.

Nāgārjuna. The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way: Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā. Translated by Jay L. Garfield, Oxford University Press, 1995.

Negarestani, Reza. Cyclonopedia: Complicity with Anonymous Materials. re.press, 2008.

Rand, Ayn. For The New Intellectual: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand. Signet, 1963.

— -. Philosophy: Who Needs It. Signet, 1984.

Sawhney, Narang Deepak. “Axiomatics: The Apparatus of Capitalism.” University of Warwick, 1996.

Thacker, Eugene. Starry Speculative Corpse: The Horror of Philosophy, vol. 2. Zero Books, 2015. PDF.

How sweet terror is, not a single line, or a ray of morning sunlight fails to contain the sweetness of anguish. - Georges Bataille

How sweet terror is, not a single line, or a ray of morning sunlight fails to contain the sweetness of anguish. - Georges Bataille