Final Notes on Fichte
- The principle of sufficient reason gives us the “ →” logical connective in understanding modus ponens.
- The idea of the F/Act is unsubstantiated (or begs the question for its justification when assumed by Fichte) and therefore the way this epistemic principle is established through action, or at least the specific actions of the Absolute I that Fichte describes, is a defeater for the Wissenschaftslehre, as it would have to come before the first two principles.
- There is no reason why modus ponens was able to be known from what we got from Fichte, i.e., the idea that having an understanding of p, q, and → means that we can know modus ponens is nowhere derived from the first principles of the Wissenschaftenslehre, and so Fichte can’t have access to this argument.
- Fichte supposes deduction is justified and doesn't even mention this supposition in any of his works (which is surprising because he even notes that he isn’t to suppose the laws of logic for the Wissenschaftslehre). Hence, the logocentric predicament is a defeater for the entirety of Fichte’s 1794/95 Jena Wissenschaftslehre (and it is a defeater for all of his reworkings of the Wissenschaftlehre he did after that to his death).