Is Circularity Logically Necessitated by the Notion?
The notion of justification itself seems logically circular to me… Is this latter proposition justified? Fuck! I guess not.
I’m remembering back to a conversation about the epistemic validity of the problem of induction as an actual problem. In this conversation, Erik appealed to his theory of justification to justify his usage of induction. I then asked him what justified his theory of justification.
From this what is extricable is specifically this notion of justifying justification, an entirely circular operation. That any critique of transcendental arbitration, the only non-circular form of arbitration, is necessarily unjustified stems from this. As Erik rightly has said in our conversations about our book on transcendental arbitration, “transcendental arbitration is the only form of meta-justification that is not logically circular.”
The fundamental problem of our book is specifically on how such non-circularity will be reached deductively!