Logic Contra Theology and Atheology

What a theologian feels to be true must be false: this provides almost a criterion of truth.

— Friedrich Nietzsche, The Anti-Christ

What an atheologian feels to be true must be true: this provides almost a criterion of truth.

— Evan Jack, A Treatise on Atheology

A Dazed Introduction[1]

No essay has troubled me as much as this one. I don’t even know if this mess is finished…

Logic Contra Theology and Atheology

We are to run against Nick Land’s classic claim from Fanged Noumena that “[l]ogic, after all, is from the start theology” (Land 298). Cybernetics can be positively maintained in relation to the theoretical primitive, though homeostatic regulators may be put in place after its presupposition. My friend Aish recently proposed that because logic is orderly and good it is therefore in accordance with God. Her entire proposition was that God is logic. This, though, is obviously a horrible position for the theist. The logocentric predicament renders exactly why God being logic is not a tenable position. The logocentric predicament, taken to its full conclusion, reveals that logic’s ability to justify itself is viciously circular and infinitely regressive. Without the theoretical primitive, the latter conclusion of the logocentric predicament could easily be said to be the case. And, if it is, then logic is (in)formally illogical — analyticity collapses under its own weight. Now, she argued that God was “the first cause” and therefore no regression takes place. But, the issue with this reveals the issue with the entirety of her proposition: there is a massive false equivocation that theists do when it comes to God. God cannot be both truth and logic, because logic comes before truth. Does God precede himself? Obviously not. God is immanently within himself. And, we must also note, that this usage of God in a cosmological sense of first cause, and in a metalogical sense as self-justifying is not only a categorically erring proposition but also a massive falsely equivocating proposition. Furthermore, Thomists’ arguments against the omnipotence paradox, generally entailing the proposition that God can only do all that is (logically) possible, are absolutely self-defeating. It generally causes me to scoff: God, the highest of all highs, the holiest holiness, is bound to simple inferential laws. Some god… Furthermore, that God is self-justifying, and therefore the final (metalogical/metaepistemological) cause, already supposes the very paradigm of logical analyticity in that the only reason we put forward that God has a unique status as a truth-maker or justificatory mechanism is because of the very concept of God and its constituent concepts (such as omnipotence, omnipresence, omniscience, etc.). Therefore, the proposition that God is the final cause within a conceptual sequence is a proposition that supposes its conclusion that God is the final cause, for it did not suppose that then analyticity would not be established, therefore meaning that proposition is fundamentally begging the question and (in)formally illogical. This is why Bahnsen’s presuppositionalism is better than any other apologetic argument/defense for God. Presuppositionalism purports to not start with autonomous reason, though it does (but more on this later), but rather with the word of God alone. Whereas, Aish, for example, starts with autonomous reason and tries to reason out that God is justified. Ultimately, therefore, if Aish is not doing this, then she supposes that God is already justified, therefore meaning all of her assertions beg the question in that her method (God’s word [instead of logic]) is absolutely and viciously circular. Though, specifically in response to Aish’s original proposition, that logic is equal to order is simply unfounded. Disorder still has a certain structural order, a structured movement. All theists have done thus far is falsely equivocate and erringly appeal to spatio-semantics. God is not needed, contra Bahnsen and others, for grounding logic. The theoretical primitive allows reason (and logic) to be autonomous. Neither is God the first cause either. Following Bataille’s absolutely devastating critique of the whole theological enterprise that has been slowly constructed by philosophers, God cannot be for he must always go beyond all that limits him, for if he does not, then he is not at all God. Therefore, God must go beyond being God. Bataille’s idea of the Divine comes into view, and atheological mysticism is then affirmed to reject God, and then rejected through autonomous reason. Nonknowledge has no bearing on our project any longer. Bataille’s fundamental proposition in The Unfinished System of Nonknowledge that all knowledge rests on circularity is fundamentally correct. But, we disagree with Bataille only at the point of nonknowledge. Bataille says, “Circular thought is the only plausible thought. To be of one’s time is quite simply to be a stooge. … But circular thought must begin not from a proposition but from the ignorance that precedes it, and it culminates in nonknowledge as well. … All mystical positions are shortened circles, therefore the moments of nonknowledge are intellectual short” (Bataille 167). Bataille’s position is contra logic in that “[s]overeignty is an act of rebellion against every rule, including the logical rule” (Bataille 161). Bataille’s position leads to “[a] negation of every limit, of every condition, this is the taste for an experience that can no longer be limited by any of the given conditions, the affirmation of a choice against philosophy” (Bataille 161). Let us not forget that inner experience is a negative movement in that it contests its own authority!

In my opinion, Bataille and the other atheologians (my past self included) are much more of a threat to our project than theologians are. In regards to Bataille’s point, though, we obviously can identify that Bataille is reaching this conclusion through reasoning, but because nonknowledge induces an annihilatory state of sovereignty and inner experience, we must realize that Bataille is doing a fundamentally rationalist operation, but it is one which uses reason to destroy itself.[2] How are we to contend with Bataille’s position? For Bataille, it is nonknowledge that precedes propositions and it is also the case that propositions end in nonknowledge. This is why nonknowledge is ([non?]viciously) circular. But, is this case? We, to not succumb to Bataille’s atheological critique, are to avoid connecting the theoretical primitive to the subject, or to anything other than itself. The theoretical primitive is not dependent on the subject nor object’s supposition of it, because it supposes itself in the movement of the analytic constitution of itself (therefore also justifying analyticity). But, the issue is not about the theoretical primitive but about what it is, whether that be pure general logic or something else. If it is pure general logic, we will have to somehow elude metaphysical presuppositions. But, I digress (this is all for another time). Supposing that I am able to find a way to have the theoretical primitive completely disconnected from both the subject and object, therefore meaning it has sufficient “existence” “in itself,” we will respond to Bataille’s inadvertent critique. Is it the case that we start with nonknowledge? Not at all (as we will all come to see, the theoretical primitive is to become our weapon of reason, able to strike through all fallacious theoretical constructions). If, in able, to even think, know, or not know, etc., we must suppose the theoretical primitive then things, in fact do not start with nonknowledge (with ignorance). Rather, because the theoretical primitive is itself the a priori essence of justification, it is not just the a priori essence of logic and epistemological justification, but metaphysical justification, which is to say, in order for Being to be or not be, either itself must justify its existence, not in a normative sense but rather in the sense that it justifies the claim to the truth of the proposition that Being is or is not, or have something else justify its existence. Therefore, in order for ignorance to even be the case (which, and I’m aware of the complexities of Bataille’s metaphysics, ontology, and [especially his] cosmology, by “be the case” I do not mean this in the sense of being or any ontological, existential, or ontic sense, but in all senses which are applicable to Bataille’s theory at hand in that theoretical primitive is of all sense, all domains, etc., it is presupposed by all [we can know this a priori because of the analyticity of the theoretical primitive, therefore meaning we elude any claim of misunderstanding Bataille]). Thus, it is not nonknowledge but the theoretical primitive which is at the beginning. It is not a proposition, nor ignorance, but an infinitely progressive, and infinitely self-justifying presupposition. Remember, we are engaging in de facto explanation. Infinitely regressing through supposing itself and infinitely progressing through justifying itself (because, different from all other supposed “final causes,” the theoretical primitive is the a priori essence of justification [as well as all other theoretical constructions]) — therefore, if something moves back one step and then moves forward one step, it will infinitely remained in the same place, or at least two places, rather than an infinite amount of places. In fact, the fact that the theoretical primitive goes back and forth only attests to its nature. Because the theoretical primitive is the a priori essence of all of things, both justified and unjustified, it, therefore, is both of the justified and the unjustified. Now, this does not mean that the theoretical primitive is also a condition of unjustification and is therefore unjustified? Not necessarily! Ultimately, it depends on what the theoretical primitive is in that if the theoretical primitive is logic, and because logic is normative, we can reject unjustification, and of course unjustified propositions will suppose the theoretical primitive in that they are propositions. But, one could argue that here I am avoiding the objection I have just made to myself, and I believe there is truth to this. One could argue specifically that because the theoretical primitive is the a priori essence of unjustification it is immanently unjustified in that the condition for it being unjustified is the presupposition of itself. This would therefore reveal that the theoretical primitive is nothing less than contradiction, therefore resulting in non-logical pluralism (and maybe even trivialism). Could we not question the very proposition of conditions of unjustification? The conditions for something to be unjustified would be its unique defeator entailed in the concept (assuming it has one) as well as it not supposing the theoretical primitive in that there is not unjustification without the theoretical primitive, i.e., the very assertion of unjustification itself being unjustified (as a corollary of the theoretical primitive being the a priori essence of justification) supposes a rejection of the theoretical primitive. Something is itself unjustified through its rejection of the theoretical primitive, it would be like something pulling the rug out from under it. But, again, one could argue I have, again, avoided my objection. Why is the conceptual dynamics between the theoretical primitive and justification and the conceptual dynamics between the theoretical primitive and unjustification different? Why are all those things which are unjustified not in accordance with the theoretical primitive and that which is unjustified not in accordance with the theoretical primitive? Why can we not just switch the two terms within my latter solution? Does my latter solution itself not suppose logic? The theoretical primitive is the a priori essence of both justification and unjustification. The conditions of a proposition being justified (as something, e.g., true, false, etc.) entail unjustification in that the very assertion that something is unjustified requires justification. In this sense unjustification supposes justification to build it up and then to subsequently tear it down. In other words, the proposition that the theoretical primitive is unjustified in that it is a precondition of unjustification itself would have to be justified through inferences grounded in the theoretical primitive (which again is not viciously circular if we are able to get out of this issue we have just raised). If the theoretical primitive renders itself unjustified then it cannot at the same time render itself as the precondition of unjustification in that it must “justify” unjustification. But, again, this third solution I have just made does not seem satisfactory to me. So, let me try again until I get this right. The issue that has arised is the theoretical primitive seems to justify itself and also unjustify itself in that it is precondition (a priori essence) of both justification and unjustification. How does this not undermine the theoretical primitive? The theoretical primitive is both justified and unjustified or rather contains all justifications and unjustifications. Ultimately, the theoretical primitive only has to do with justification in that unjustification necessitates a justification that it is unjustified, i.e., the appeal to analyticity is still a justification. The theoretical primitive, therefore, is never a condition of unjustification, for it is rather a condition of the justification of something being unjustified, i.e., the condition of X being unjustified is that it, one, has its unique conditions of the justification of why it is unjustified (i.e., the conditions of unjustification), and, two, the supposition of the theoretical primitive. Thus, the theoretical primitive is always and only a precondition for the justification of things, whether that be the justification of justification, of unjustification, etc. We can also use this to resolve all other concepts such as truth, untruth, logic, illogic, in that we have a formula here. Justification of justification; justification of unjustification; proving truth true; proving that it is true that falsity is false; logically necessitating illogic to be illogic; and logic necessitating logic. That positive terms demonstrate dominance as well as the logocentric predicament which the theoretical primitive has the ability to solve (assuming it is logic). Now, I will say I have exhausted my mind, and am not satisfied with my solutions here. Please give feedback if you can!

God regresses infinitely in that God has two preconditions of justification: 1. The presupposition of the theoretical primitive and 2. being in accordance with God’s word. One could argue that God is the theoretical primitive but I aim to show that this not the case, for if it is not the case then God will have to suppose the theoretical primitive as well. Does this not show the impossibility of God’s omnipotence, therefore? I believe does. Therefore, the dissociation of God from the theoretical primitive leads to nothing other than God having to have a precondition other than itself, therefore meaning God would not be God.

Bataille’s discourse on reason is very interesting and surprisingly clarifying: “Reason determines the end and the means … then it refuses the truth that it defines … Reason alone knows that it has the power to deify that which it limits (Bataille 229). In a fundamentally atheological movement, we, unsurprisingly, posit that reason is opposed to God. But, we deny Bataille’s proposition that “[w]hat opposes Reason to God eludes Reason” (Bataille 231). For it is reasoning, the very interpellation of reason, that opposes reason to God.

Now, having dealt with atheology by showing how reason, at its very base (the logocentric predicament), does not deconstruct itself but rather justifies, constitutes, constructs, etc. itself, we are to move back to theology.[3] Now, when we speak of supposition in regards to the theoretical primitive, we must be clear. Is the theoretical primitive more the theoretical primitive or the theoretical primitive. I would say the latter. In regards to supposition, we must have an autonomous view of things. All things whether they be physical, conceptual, etc. must presuppose the theoretical primitive? Well, in this sense, we would be saying that a precondition for Being and knowing would be the presupposition of the theoretical primitive. Does this not seem like a far cry from Robert Hanna’s usage of it in relation to theoretical construction? Maybe so… I think it is fair to say that concepts and their validity must suppose the theoretical primitive for them to be in that they themselves must act as autonomous epistemic entities and justify themselves or have a subject/object external to the concept justify its validity. This seems to be in line with Hanna’s usage. Hanna’s emphasis on theoretical construction, which in the case of autonomous concepts they would be constructing themselves therefore the theoretical primitive would apply, works with our epistemic understanding of the ontology of concepts and their interpellation into being. Now, the notion of Being being contingent on the theoretical primitive, we can recognize that the theoretical primitive comes into being through its presupposition, therefore, at the highest level, the theoretical primitive does not suppose Being, but it is the other way around, Being supposes the theoretical primitive. Now, this seems to fall into the issue of the cogito which is simply that syntactically Descartes “proof” supposes the ‘I’. Do we not also suppose the theoretical primitive here in the same fashion as Descartes’ supposition of the ‘I’? I would argue that we don’t in that the theoretical primitive did not come from nothing, nor did it come from something other than itself. Rather, it interpellates itself in that presupposition is immanent? It interpellates itself because of necessity? Necessary to what? Now it seems we have come to the heart of the matter. Why does God exist? Why does the theoretical primitive exist? Do both of these not suppose themselves in the same way Descartes supposes the I? It seems so in the case of God. As for the theoretical primitive, obviously, I beg to differ. Because God and the theoretical primitive do not exist for us, necessity arguments cannot be the case, for our existence is in the air as of now, for without a method to verify our existence, we can do absolutely nothing. So, why must God and the theoretical primitive exist? God must exist, for the theologian, because that is his duty. As I said in my treatise on atheology, “God, in our conception of Him as a homogeneous and supreme being, cannot for a second expend Himself because He has a duty to exist, precluding God from losing Himself in expenditure” (Jack). But, again, this is for the theologian. If God and the theoretical primitive exist for themselves, do they not suppose the ‘they’? God clearly, without reason, does not seem to exist. Furthermore, when it comes to God, nothingness is problematic. Whereas, for the theoretical primitive, nothingness is in no way problematic. The theoretical primitive always exists because its presuposition is always instantiated by itself in that it does not need to be in order for it it be presupposed. But, who is the presupposer? Why can the theoretical primitive not do so? The whole issue of the cogito is that the I is supposing itself. Ultimately, the theoretical primitive because its very nature answers the “Why must there be a theoretical primitive?” due to the fact that it must and ought to be in that it is an autonomous, analytic a priori, and therefore, pure concept which is general, applying to all domains logical or illogical, and therefore a view of pure general logic which is not dependent on metaphysical presuppositons (e.g., the mind exists) comes into view. It does not depend on anything to be in that it precedes conceptualization and is the precondition of conceptualization and theoretical construction.

If God is bound by the laws of the logic, i.e., he can do all that is possible, let’s say hypothetically that there was a reality in which nothing was possible. God, therefore, could do nothing. Again, Aish’s position, which is the position that God is analogous to the laws of logic, through a simple reductio, demonstrates that God’s glory can amount to nothing. Furthermore, what laws of logic are unreviseable? We can revise logical principles, and therefore, are we not also in revising logical principles, revising what God can do? The posting of God as an object of logic-based theology (an absolute contradiction in terms) is exactly what Bataille critiques — atheological critique returns once more! That God is beyond logic if God is to be God is absolutely certain. I think Leonard Peikoff is certainly right in this regard then: “Every argument for God … rests on a false metaphysical premise” (Peikoff in the second lecture of The Philosophy of Objectivism lecture series).

For instance, God is infinite. Nothing can be infinite, according to the Law of Identity. Everything is what is is, and nothing else. It is limited in its qualities and in its quantity: it is this much, and no more. “Infinite” as applied to quantity does not mean “very large”: it means “larger than any specific quantity.” That means: no specific quanity — i.e., a quantity without identity. This is prohibited by the Law of Identity. Is God the creator of the universe? There can be no creation of something out of nothing. There is no nothing. Is God Omnipotent? Can he do anything? Entities can act only in accordance with their natures; nothing can make them violate their natures… “God” as traditionally defined is a systematic contradiction. (Peikoff in the second lecture of The Philosophy of Objectivism lecture series)

Peikoff demonstrates Bataille’s atheological critique of God in a more systematic fashion: “If God were to be God, then he would have to go beyond being God, and therefore would not be God; therefore, God is not God.” If God is beyond logic, then any attempt at logical explanation and/or justification of God(’s existence) would be begging the question. This, therefore, would also mean that the positing of God beyond logic too begs the question, and God will be unable to answer, ironically (all-knowing, my ass). Autonomous reason is just that autonomous reason. Any theist must either start with God or autonomous reason. By the standards of both, each one is a false starting point. In my opinion, any theist who does not begin with God has it all wrong; but, even if they do start with God, they still have it all wrong. Autonomous reason, interpellating itself through reasoning (following the theoretical primitive’s self-interpellation), allows for the sacrifice of God (i.e., the rational and logical rejection of God) because of God’s fundamental servility in the face of its master who we call Reason (with a capital r, so you know it is important).

As for which God is actually God, assuming there is a God, no one can necessarily know. All claims for Christianity or Islam, for example, being the true doctrine of God are only abductive claims. These claims are in no way deduced from anything non-circularly, in that logic precedes God, as we have gone over. Therefore, that God is analogous to what is good, or that God is good, as Aish assumptively purports, does not follow from any logical deduction but rather from one’s best guess, i.e., through abductive reasoning (seems reason confronts and defeats God once more).

In response to necessity arguments, we must ask the question that they beg: “Necessary for what?” They will obviously say necessary for existence or validity. So, let’s analyze this. In regards to existential necessity (necessary for existence to be), we are to reveal to circularity of the entire enterprise that is the cosmological argument. It first supposes existence. Second, it argues that God is the only explanation of the creation of existence. Third, it concludes that existence is due to God. The premise is that existence is the case and the conclusion is that existence is the case because of God. Now, if we ask them to warrant that existence is the case, then they will have to appeal to what? God? Ha! The folly of the cosmological argument has been demonstrated. As for the argument that God is the basis of reason’s validity. This is obviously not necessary in that the theoretical primitive does it not only as effectively as God but also more so and then some. In other words, we have another explanation; God is not the only, and therefore, necessary explanation.

Theists collapse when the logocentric predicament is put forward (unless they are presuppositionalists or Kierkegaardians): in Logic: A God-Centered Approach to the Foundation of Western Thought, Vern Poythress says,

Are we engaged in circular reasoning? We are already relying on a particular conception of reasoning and logic when we use arguments to establish our conception of logic. But there is no other way of arguing when the nature of logic itself is at stake. We start with instruction in the Bible, and we use it in order to reform logic. (Poythress 38)

They then go on to say, “Autonomy is a circle. Socratic reasoning assumes autonomy at the beginning” (Poythress 38). But this is not the case, what autonomous reason assumes at the beginning is the theoretical primitive.

Presuppositionalists can make a claim to defacto explanation just as we do. This is absolutely fine. But, they must explain, since they are without the theoretical primitive, what they are arguing after the fact of? They would probably say God, God’s knowledge/word, the presupposition of God, etc. But, that God, and I have said this many times, has any unique purchase on self-justification assumes the paradigm of logical analyticity. As Robert Hanna says in “Kant, Wittgenstein, and Transcendental Philosophy,” “every analytic truth is presupposed by every sentence or statement whatsoeve” (Hanna 83). In other words, when Bahnsen says, “The standard of meaning and truth is always the mind of God,” how does he know what God, truth, and meaning mean (Bahnsen 16)? How does one know what the words in the Bible mean anything at all? Why do some of those people with the Holy Spirit in them have contradicting positions on the Bible and its interpretation? How are we to deal with the subjectivity of signification? How are we to deal with a history of translation and possible error? Does the presuppositionalist collapse into the position that God has prevented all of these things? If so (and this seems to be the only option), again, how do those who have the Holy Spirit within their hearts disagree on scripture? Subjectivity corrodes the supposed truth of the Bible. Furthermore, that ‘God’ means anything at all supposes analyticity. For if it does not, then God is Satan. Meaning supposes analyticity.

The presuppositionalist has some questions for us: 1. “[W]hat standard should be utilized for guidance, judgment, and argument” (Bahnsen 11); 2. “Is the acceptance of that standard based on an arbitrary volition or upon a reasoned case?” (Bahnsen 11); 3. “How can one be sure his standard is right, and to what degree of certainty is he entitled?” (Bahnsen 11). So, let’s answer his questions. Bahnsen will say to us that we suppose we are correct, and we do not necessarily agree. Yes, we suppose the theoretical primitive but that is what makes us correct. So, in response to his first question we put forward the theoretical primitive as our standard (and it is also Bahnsen’s standard, he just has not realized it). In response to his second question we say neither. It is not volitional in that volition, which would be based on thinking, would suppose the theoretical primitive. Nor is it based on rational justification in that we are not engaging in any “case.” We are not engaging in ex ante justification (which Bahnsen actually seems to fall into), but rather in post facto explanation. Then to respond to his third question we can say absolutely certain in that condition for certainty is the theoretical primitive. Now, Bahnsen in no way can disagree with our answers because our answers are in a certain sense “structurally” the same (just replace the theoretical primitive with God and you will see what I mean).

Bahnsen still comes to us, asking us to do what he says is impossible:

[W]ithout Christian presuppositions there is no intelligible use of facts and logic — that human knowledge and interpretation fail instantly. Therefore, to be reasonable at all, men must submit to the ultimate standard of God’s self-atttesting word; to refuse this is to insist upon intellectual foolishness and eternal damnation. (Bahnsen 14)

Further in regard to Bahnsen, let us note his words in the Great Debate which he held against Gordon Stein:

The transcendental proof for God’sexistence is that without Him it is impossible to prove anything. The atheist worldview is irrational and cannot consistently provide the preconditions of intelligible experience, science, logic, or morality. The atheist worldview cannot allow for the laws of logic, the uniformity of nature, the ability for the mind to understand the world, and moral absolutes. In that sense the atheist worldview cannot account for our debate tonight.

the laws of logic. Let me quote scripture against Aish, “But Jesus beheld them, and said unto them, ‘With men this is impossible; but with God all things are possible’” (Matthew 19:26 [King James Version]). To suggest that God is bound by logic is heresy. For, if God is bound by logic, then he is subordinated to it. To say that logic is the consequence of God’s nature is not only a logical inference but at the same time a proposition that does not solve the predicament, for the question then becomes “[i]s this nature changeable” (“A Dozen Responses to th Transcendental Argument for God”). Because God can do anything, because he can make anything possible, he can therefore change his nature. Therefore, things go into flux. Oh? God cannot change his own nature? Obviously, saying God binds himself is to misunderstand what “omni” means. Infinity cannot be bound.[4] Change, as we are using it here, is not caught up in issues of temporality. God must be outside of time in order to be God. One could argue that because he knows all things, he can already assume the state which he will change into. This isn’t necessarily the case though. God could know that he is going to change his state. There is no reason for him to immediately assume that state that he will assume later on. Furthermore, in regards to the Transcendental Argument for God (or TAG which is what presuppositionalism supposes), we must understand that the logocentric predicament reveals its stupidity. A presupposition of TAG is that the laws of logic are “properly basic belief[s]” (“Is the Transcendental Argument Fair?”). Obviously, the logocentric predicament reveals how this is a presupposition itself. Therefore, TAG can be expressed syllogistically as follows:

P1: The laws of logic exist

P2: If the laws of logic exist, then God exists

C1: God exists

When one asks the theist to justify premise one, they obviously can appeal to God which leads to this:

P1: God exists

P2: If God exists, then the laws of logic exist

C1: The laws of logic exist

Now, if we then ask them to warrant that God exists, they will say “God exists because logic exists.” We would then ask, why does logic exist, and they would say, “Logic exists because God exists.” Thus, let us put their statements together: “God exists because logic exists which exists because God exists” which could alternatively be said as “Logic exists because God exists which exists because logic exists.” The vicious circularity of the approach is clear (seems William Lane Craig was right about presuppositionalism). There even seems to be an argument called The Transcendental Argument for the Nonexistence of God or (TANG).[5] The Kierkegaardian approach seems to be the only theistic approach that can deal with such an issue in a non-logical manner.[6]

The logical consequence of the logocentric predicament is Bataille’s terminally unfinished system of nonknowledge. In this sense, my entire philosophical movement is nothing but a movement of emancipation. Specifically, the emancipation of me from my roots. It is a movement of positing an authority which inner experience cannot contest. This is the challenge. Can I meet it?

I will say that the theoretical primitive in some sense seems to open the way to the creation of a complete system of philosophy, or Wissenschaftslehre to pay reference to Fichte who underwent the same task that we are, which starts with something and ends with that same something, therefore making the system an irrefutable and also content-filled tautology.

Appendix 1: A Potential Contradiciton in the Bible?

Verses in support of God’s not being able to be seen:

“For the law was given through Moses; grace and truth came through Jesus Christ. No one has ever seen God, but the one and only Son, who is Himself God and is at the Father’s side, has made Him known.” John 1:17–18

“But He added, ‘You cannot see My face, for no one can see Me and live.’” Exodus 33:20

“He alone is immortal and dwells in unapproachable light. No one has ever seen Him, nor can anyone see Him. To Him be honor and eternal dominion! Amen.” 1st Timothy 6:16

“No one has seen God at any time.” 1st John 4:12

Verses which admit that (parts of) God can be seen:

“Then I will take My hand away, and you will see My back; but My face must not be seen.” Exodus 33:23

Verses which admit that God has been seen:

“The Lord appeared to Abram and said, ‘To your descendants I will give this land.’ And there he built an altar to the Lord, who had appeared to him.” Genesis 12:7

“Now when Abram was ninety-nine years old, the Loard appeared to him and said to him,” Genesis 17:1

“And I appeared unto Abraham, to Issac, and to Jacob as God Almighty.” Exodus 6:3

“My ears had heard of you but now my eyes have seen you.” Job 42:5

Verses that demonstrate people seeing not only God but also God’s face:

“So Jacob named the place Peniel, saying, ‘Indeed, I have seen God face to Face, and yet my life was spared.’” Genesis 32:30

“So the Lord spoke to Moses face to face, as a man speaks to his friend.” Exodus 33:11

“See that you do not despise one of these little ones. For I tell you that in heave their angels always see the face of my Father who is in heaven.” Matthew 18:10[7]

Appendix 2: Preliminary Remarks Preceding the Further Identification of the Theoretical Primitive

The theoretical primitive applies to all things, domains, etc. without prejudice which is to say it is general. The theoretical primitive is a priori in that it does not suppose anything (including experience) which is to say it is pure. Hence, the similarities between pure general logic and the theoretical primitive seem great. The final movement which would also be that movement that transforms the logocentric predicament into a mechanism/proof for logic’s justification.

Notes

[1]: Quick note 1: the theoretical primitive functions just like Hanna’s protologic described in Rationality and Logic in that all logics suppose it, and therefore whether we have pluralistic or monistic theories of logic is completely irrelevant to the tenability of the theoretical primitive.

[2]: In the introduction to On Bataille: Critical Essays, Leslie Anne Boldt-Irons speaks of “Bataille’s admitted deliberate use of reason to deconstruct its own constructions” (Boldt-Irons 6). They then quote Bataille himself, “Reason alone has the power to undo its work, to hurt down what it has built up… Without the support of reason, we don’t reach dark incandescence” (qtd. in Boldt-Irons 6). The logocentric predicament, then, is a greatly Bataillean construction. In a certain sense, expenditure is not a rationalist operation but one which dissolves reason in that expenditure is a subject expending themselves (annihilating themselves) in that the subject is “spending his wealth without reason” (Bataille 244).

[3]: Finally, I have gotten closer to justifying my movement away from Bataille! Though, I must say, he will always be there holding my hand, in all of my theoretical journeys.

[4]: ∞ — ∞ = ∞ or ∞ — ∞ = undefined. ∞ — ∞ ≠ 0, for if I said that ∞ — ∞ = 0 then I could say ∞ — ∞ + 1 = 0 + 1 which would be to say ∞ — ∞ = 1 which obviously cannot be the case.

[5]: See Michael Martin’s “The Transcendent Argument for the Nonexistence of God” as well as his “A Response to John Frame’s Rebuttal of The Transcendental Argument for the Nonexistence of God (TANG).”

[6]: See Charles Djordjevic’s “What is Wordly Logic and Why Might it Lead to Suicide? Kierkegaard, Wittgenstein, and the Critique of Logic.”

[7]: This one is interesting because it says in Isaiah 6:2 that “Above it [the throne of the LORD] stood the seraphims: each one had six wings; with twain he convered face, and with twain he covered his feet, and with twain he did fly.” So, it seems Angels cannot see God’s face, in fact, it seems they cover their face in order to not do so. Yet, it is clear, according to Matthew’s “divinely inspired” words, that angels at all times see the face of God in his highest (i.e., heavenly) state.