03/14/2022
§1: The logocentric predicament, stated and explained
The predicament that the logocentric predicament is, is a predicament not of logic in itself, but of our use of logic. With Henry M. Sheffer, Harvard logician, the logocentric predicament originates and is simply explained,
Just as proof of certain theories in metaphysics is made difficult, if not hopeless, because of the « egocentric » predicament, so the attempt to formulate the foundations of logic is rendered arduous by a corresponding « logocentric » predicament. In order to give an account of logic, we must presuppose and employ logic. (Sheffer, “Principia Mathematica. Whitehead, Alfred North, and Russel, Bertrand,” pp. 227–228)
The issue always arrived at is found in the employment of what one is trying to prove, which, in this case, is the existence of logic and therefore (logically) necessary inferences. Therefore, if there is no use, i.e., employment, there is no predicament. Those means which we use, which we employ, typically, are inferential principles and inferences. Therefore, non-inferential justification gets around the logocentric predicament. Therefore, in order to get past the logocentric predicament, we will have to line out a theory of non-inferential justification that can withstand all skepticism and critique. This is our massive burden to bear, but it is the burden that all philosophers bear, whether they realize it or not.
§2: Metafoundationalism, stated and explained
Foundationalism is a necessity for solving the logocentric predicament. No other epistemology allows for a non-inferential justification. But, there are obviously metaepistemological issue that arise. Thus, metafoundationalism is that epistemology that we are to bear in order to solve the logocentric predicament. The philosophy of “metafoundationalism” was, as far as I know and am concerned, originated with Timothy and Lydia McGrew in their book Internalism and Epistemology which we are to take heavily from in our solving of the logocentric predicament (McGrew, Internalism and Epistemology, p. 109).
§2.1: Metafoundations, stated and explained
Just as foundationalism has foundational knowledge, or foundations, metafoundationalism has metafoundational knowledge, or metafoundations. But just what are metafoundations? The McGrews explain, metafoundations are “metalevel propositions that stop the metaregress” (McGrew, Internalism and Epistemology, p. 94). Therefore, what we need is a metafoundation for inference-making, or, better yet, for deduction. This begs the question though: what is our metafoundation for inference-making which is synonymous with the solution to the logocentric predicament?
Before we can understand what our metafoundation for logic is, we must further understand the character of metafoundations. The McGrews explicitly and repeatedly explain that the character of metafoundations is a priori, “emphasizing analytic a priori knowledge” specifically when they are talking about metafoundations (McGrew, Internalism and Epistemology, p. 94). Thus, we must grasp analyticity before we can even begin to grasp metafoundations.
§2.2: Analyticity, stated and explained
Analyticity is simply understood as having the predicate contained in the subject. The classic example is put forward is that “all bachelors are unmarried.” The McGrews explain, “Fluent speakers of English immediately recognize that this expresses a truth, and those uncorrupted by Quine recognize that it expresses a necessary truth” (McGrew, Internalism and Epistemology, p. 96). They further that these fluent speakers do not recognize this truth “by deduction from evident first principles. Rather, so runs the traditional answer, one’s recognition that this sentence expresses a necessary truth arises out of a knowledge of the meanings of the terms involved” (McGrew, Internalism and Epistemology, p. 96). This independence of analyticity from empirical knowledge is what gives analyticity its a priori character. The McGrews turn to John Locke’s doctrine of intuition elaborated in Book IV of his Essay Concerning Human Understanding to further understand the “traditional theory of analytic a priori knowledge” (McGrew, Internalism and Epistemology, p. 96). So, let us turn to Locke’s essay.
Locke, in section four of Book IV, says,
’Tis the first act of the mind, when it has any sentiments or ideas at all, to perceive its ideas, and so far as it perceives them, to know each what it is, and thereby also to perceive their difference, and that one is not another. This is so absolutely necessary, that without it there could be no knowledge, no reasoning, no imagination, no distinct thoughts at all. By this the mind clearly and infallibly perceives each idea to agree with itself, and to be what it is; and all distinct ideas to disagree, i.e. the one not to be the other: and this it does without pains, labour, or deduction; but at first view, by its natural power of perception and distinction. (Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Bk. IV, Ch. 1, §4, p. 678)
To understand what has just been said in a way that leads us to the solving of the logocentric predicament, we will follow the McGrews in their interpretation and reworking of Locke’s doctrine of intuition. The McGrews, moving way from Locke’s position as a concept empiricist, state, “the concepts of identity and distinctness themselves are presumably discernible as distinct by intuition, and they can hardly be said to be sensuous” (McGrew, Internalism and Epistemology, pp. 96–97). The means by which identity and distinctness are themselves arrived at by the mind is not at all actually a means, rather it is an intuition, not a process of reasoning that goes through pains, labor, and deduction. This, then, would solve part of the logocentric predicament in that we have arrived at the principles of identity and non-contradiction (by the first act of the mind that is the apprehension of identity and distinctness through by way of intuition). Thus, we must come to further understand and then explicate what intuition is for Locke.
§2.3: Lockean intuition, stated and explained
The McGrews explain, intuition is the first act of the mind per Locke, and, in this way, “intuition is epistemically prior to other modes of knowledge; no regress looms. Though it may involve a comparison of concepts that were first given in experience, it does not depend upon some further experience that is the relation of those concepts: the relation is intrinsic and the perception of it infallible” (McGrew, Internalism and Epistemology, p. 97). Okay, but why is intuition justified? Why is what we intuit actually the case? Intuition is our metafoundation, but we can only understand why it is such after “elaboration and refinement” of both our understanding and doctrine of intuition (McGrew, Internalism and Epistemology, p. 97). The McGrews explain that Russell, in the face of intuition being self-evidently justificatory, argued that “luminous obviousness, by itself, seems, as a matter of empirical fact, to be insufficient to insure truth” (qtd. in McGrew, Internalism and Epistemology, p. 97). The move that the McGrews go for is putting forward a new understanding of what it means for something to be self-evident, for there to be “the ‘evident lustre’ of intuitive truths for the attentive mind” that Locke speaks of (McGrew, Internalism and Epistemology, p. 97). This natural light Descartes speaks of is nothing other than “a relation of direct acquaintance that is sui generis and essentially relational” (McGrew, Internalism and Epistemology, p. 97). Thus, for the McGrews, it is when one is in direct acquaintance with the meaning of a analytic a priori proposition that they have intuitive knowledge that “this [analytic a priori proposition] expresses a necessary truth arises out of a knowledge of the meanings of the terms involved” (McGrew, Internalism and Epistemology, p. 96). In this sense, we would have a true belief, but would it be a justified true belief, which is to ask, would we have knowledge, as “knowledge is justified true belief” (McGrew, Internalism and Epistemology, p. 33). The question that could be put forward at this time is why is analyticity that which is true in virtue of its meaning? Obviously, we could all it whatever we want, but what the signifiers signifies is nonetheless still there no matter what we call it; this question, therefore, is inconsequential in the sense that it in no way undermines are movement toward the solution to the logocentric predicament. What we must, in light of what has just transpired, turn toward now in our analysis is direct acquaintance.
All that we have put forward thus far would be the case if direct acquaintance which demystifies the metaphor of natural light, of the self-evident character of intuitive knowledge (Lockean intuitions). For this to be the case, direct acquaintance, which, let me clarify, is in no way separate from intuitions, rather, direct acquaintance only describes the nature of intuitions themselves, must be justificatory. But, assuming direct acquaintance to be justificatory, we can immediately realize that it is metajustificatory too in that intuitions, which direct acquaintance describes the character of, are metafoundations. But, I digress. All that needs to be explained is why direct acquaintance is justificatory.
The McGrews explain, “One’s knowledge of one’s own concepts need not be mediated; there need not be any fallible steps by which one undertakes to determine what those concepts are” (McGrew, Internalism and Epistemology, p. 97). This is what direct acquaintance demonstrates. That no steps need to be taken is exactly what Locke meant when he spoke of the absence of pains, labor, and deduction when it comes to intuition. We will return to direct acquaintance once we have further explained all that comes from it and works in conjunction with it according to the McGrews.
The McGrews, explaining C. I. Lewis’ position, say, “Precisely because the truth is analytic, there is, on Lewis’s view, nothing more involved in knowing it a priori besides a knowledge of meanings and the connections among them” (McGrew, Internalism and Epistemology, p. 98). For the McGrews, analyticity denotes “[truth] in virtue of meanings alone” (McGrew, Internalism and Epistemology, p. 99). Therefore, analytic a priori propositions, by their very definition, are true once its meaning is apprehended. Now, whether any analytic a priori propositions exist is a different story that we will get to later on in this essay. In light of this, the McGrews then go to say, “To grasp a truth in [virtue solely of acquaintance with concepts and with the relations among them is] to show decisively one’s own justification to oneself” (McGrew, Internalism and Epistemology, p. 99). Let me summarize this all in order to make it more coherent. What the McGrews are essentially arguing is that because analytic a priori propositions are, by their very nature (definition), true in virtue of their meaning, one need only to be directly acquainted with the concepts, connectives, and meanings at hand in order to understand that analytic a priori propositions are true beliefs. But, are they justified true beliefs? The McGrews, as we just saw, argued that the justification is demonstrated to oneself in acquaintance, but how is this the case? Again, the McGrews argue that the justificatory character of these intuitions is found in direct acquaintance. It is in our direct acquaintance with an analytic a priori proposition that we not only understand its truth but are also justified in our understanding. The McGrews state this simply, “We have a priori justification for believing an analytic truth p when we see, by acquaintance with the relevant conceptual relations, that there is no alternative but for p to be true” (McGrew, Internalism and Epistemology, p. 98). Now, let us note that the McGrews do not fall to the particularist fallacy, the fallacy of a certain particular thing or behavior being binding and therefore true (for example, Aristotle commits such a fallacy when he infers from the fact that one cannot refute the principle of non-contradiction without using it that the principle of non-contradiction is therefore true). The McGrews are not saying that direct acquaintance is infallible and therefore it is true, as saying something is infallible would amount to saying something cannot go wrong, which is not to say that it must go right (it can not go at all, for example). Rather, the McGrews, intelligently avoiding the particularist fallacy, are saying that direct acquaintance cannot be anything but true, therefore it is true. Again, though, we still have a major issue alive with us: why does direct acquaintance have a justificatory character?
[Possible response 1: Direct acquaintance is simply immediate understanding, or at least this is the simplest explanation. Like Lewis argues, all one needs to have the laws of logic justified is an understanding of the logical connectives at hand. That moment of understanding is an intuition. All one, therefore, has to do to justify logic and get past the logocentric predicament is understand it. And by “it” I mean the logocentric predicament. It is the raising of the logocentric predicament that logic is used against itself, but that use itself admits the skeptic’s understanding. We have direct acquaintance with this latter fact. One may argue that I suppose words have meaning. This is a laughable “objection.” I understand that words have meaning, I am directly acquainted with that fact. Therefore, “[i]ntuitable logical truths provide the metafoundational stopping places for deduction” (McGrew, Internalism and Epistemology, p. 132).]
[Possible response 2: A self-evident proposition is self-certifying, has its warrant engraved upon its own face, as it were. It follows that to understand a proposition of this sort is already to be in possession of all that is relevant to its truth. Thomas Reid said self-eveident propositions “are no sooner understood than believed” (Essays, Woozley, ed., p. 358), but the correct formula is, rather, that understanding a self-evident proposition necessarily includes knowing the proposition to be true. There are not two things, first understanding the proposition and then seeing it to be true by the “light of reason”; in understanding it, we necessarily know it to be true, and if we have any doubt we could not have understood what we thought we were doubting. There can be no suspension of belief about a self-evident proposition. (Black, Margins of Precision, p. 18) ]
[Refute Black’s refutation of private justification — — here is his argument: The supposed analogy between vision and “mental insight” must be rejected. When a proposition is called “self-evident,” the intended meaning is that the proposition in question shall contain its own truth-ground. (The old sense of “evidence” that is relevant is approximately “that which makes the proposition true,” and the later sense in which “evidence” is always evidence for something is not in point; no rationalist has wanted to subscribe to the absurd view that any proposition can be evidence for itself.) A self-evident proposition is self-certifying, has its warrant engraved upon its own face, as it were. It follows that to understand a proposition of this sort is already to be in possession of all that is relevant to its truth. Thomas Reid said self-evident propositions “are no sooner understood than believed” (Essays, Woozley, ed., p. 358), but the correct formula is, rather, that understanding a self-evident proposition necessarily includes knowing the proposition to be true. There are not two things, first understanding the proposition and then seeing it to be true by the “light of reason”; in understanding it, we necessarily know it to be true, and if we have any doubt we could not have understood what we thought we were doubting. There can be no suspension of belief about a self-evident proposition. Now we can see why the supposed analogy between vision and “mental insight” or intuition breaks down. When a man claims a private title for his perceptual report, there is a logical gap between a certain perceptual fact and another fact consisting of his saying that he has the perception in question: he could see the red patch without saying that he saw it. And unless there were such a gap, there would be no sense in his claiming to have a title or ground for his assertion. The implied existence of a distinct truth-ground is essential to the whole conception. But precisely this feature of vision proper is intended to be absent in the case of “mental vision.” Since the truth-ground of a self-evident proposition is intended to be included in that very proposition, understanding and verifying here collapse into one and the same thing, and it no longer makes sense to speak of having even a private justification or title. (Black, Margins of Precision, pp. 18–19)]
§3: Neo-rationalism, stated and explained
Bibliography
Locke, John. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Edited by Roger Woolhouse, Penguin Books, 2004. PDF.
McGrew, Timothy and Lydia McGrew. Internalism and Epistemology: The Architecture of Reason. Routledge, 2007.
Sheffer, Henry M. “Principia Mathematica. Whitehead, Alfred North, and Russel, Bertrand.” Isis, vol. 8, no. 1, February 1926, pp. 226–231. https://doi.org/10.1086/358383
