Upcoming Projects and Some Notes

The Summer of 2022

So far, I have carefully laid out the ultimate foundations of first philosophy: non-propositional, non-inferential, epistemically private, genuine reasons for belief that serve as real justification for true beliefs. The issue of finding non-arbitrary, non-circular, and non-infinitely regressive ground to stand on has been an issue I’ve always been trying to solve. Now such an issue has been solved, thus meaning I must move on to begin outlining the architecture of first philosophy that will lay upon the foundations already lined out.

When I speak of first philosophy, I do speak of phenomenology, for any epistemology of intuitions leads first to phenomenology. The necessary structures of consciousness, the subject of transcendental phenomenology, and the necessary structures of all other things in reality, the subject of my rationalist metaphysic, will soon be outlined (hopefully [this of course assumes I don’t find something else that is more pressing, but I doubt I will]).

A very thorough critique of Objectivism is underway, for Objectivism is, at bottom, a form of empirical foundationalism. Because Objectivism has its epistemology structured in such a fashion, it will act as the empiricist alternative to my philosophy, thus meaning it is to be snuffed out, for there are to be no valid alternatives to my philosophy (p or not p). Furthermore, Objectivism has a circularity problem in terms of its axiomatics that my philosophy does not have.

Erik and some others will be writing various parts of the very expansive critique of Objectivism. I cannot stress how expansive the critique will be. Erik and I have grand intentions regarding the critique, for our goal is to demonstrate to Objectivists that logic leads to our philosophy and not the philosophy of Ayn Rand. Having converted various Objectivists, I think the base of thinkers for our philosophy will be quite strong. What results from such an intellectual community has yet to be seen, but it will be.

My close friend Gabriel has accompanied me in doing the research regarding an anti-relativist epistemology of intuitions. The largest threat to our philosophy is relativism. Relativism seeming to be entailed in epistemic privacy was the reason I stayed away from committing to epistemic privacy for so long, but now that I have made such a commitment, I must also demonstrate how relativism is not entailed. Such a demonstration will take a very long time, however, because we have already ruled out certain intuitions, we have demonstrated that there is not any existing relativism regarding what can supply justification, for certain reasons for belief, such as divine intuitions, have already been discounted due to not being foundational — a functional requirement for epistemic privacy (in other words, being a foundational belief is functionally entailed in being a non-propositional, non-inferential, epistemically autonomous belief). What must be demonstrated is that there is not any existing relativism regarding what can be justified, i.e., we must demonstrate that some things are not true and cannot be true using our epistemology of intuitions.

Erik, of course, will be working in the background of all this work Gabriel and I will be doing. Erik will, most probably, be debating using our theories of first philosophy, trying to find critiques of them that are good (though, it seems none exist at the very barebones state our theories are currently in). He will also probably “larp” positions that seem to be very probable derivatives of our theories (by “larp” I mean that Erik will take up positions and defend them but he will not actually believe in such positions).

All those who are carrying out the massive critique of Objectivism are not currently adherents to our philosophy, yet we hope they will be at the end of it.

Q & A

Some questions that must be answered:

1. Does the symmetry thesis not suppose that no division between a priori and a posteriori intuitions exists?
2. Do we discount empirical claims to knowledge of the noumenal?
3. By our theory of intuitions, intuitions have differences in their content and that defines them (e.g., empirical intuitions have empirical objects), but do intuitions have differences in their origin, metaphysical character, and/or phenomenological character, and does that define them (e.g., empirical (sensible) intuitions have a faculty of sensibility has their origin)?
4. If we make no distinction between the a priori and a posteriori, then do we not deny all forms of epistemology that claim that only one is foundational?
5. Is inference making a priori?

*

Answering some questions asked?

1. Yes, it does have such a supposition. This forces us to question its validity as it has an identified assumption.
2. Husserl says, “It is a fundamental error to suppose that perception (and every other type of intuition of things, each after its own manner) fails to come into contact with the thing itself.” However, it seems that Husserl is not trying to say that the thing itself is the same as the thing-in-itself (the noumenon).
3. In need of further investigation.
4. Yes.
5. In need of further investigation.

Neel’s Objections to Jackian Philosophy as of March 2021

In Spring Break of last year (2021), I had a series of debates with my friend Neel, in which three questions were posed as defeaters to certain assumptions of my philosophical positions at the time:

1. How can you prove that existence has a logocentric-structure, which is to say, how can you prove that all of existence is logically structured and that logic applies to it.
2. Is “things change” a presupposition of the problem of induction?
3. Can the laws of logic not be empirically confirmed?

*

Answers:

1. In need of further investigation.
2. No. When we ask, how does the empiricist know things will not change, we do not suppose that they won’t. Furthermore, we can observe change empirically. However, that doesn’t mean everything that s empirical changes, for that itself runs into the problem of induction. Thus, the anti-empiricist only runs into the issue of making a presupposition when putting forward the problem of induction when they argue that all empirical objects are subject to it. It seems that the anti-empiricist must be a skeptic… The extent to which a priori judgements are subject to the problem of induction must be investigated. Could one argue that the problem of induction has no presuppositions, it is an issue of going from particularity to universality by way of generalization? In need of further investigation.
3. In need of further investigation.

Notes

Liam and the Objectivists ask us, “When does philosophizing start?” They answer, “Consciousness.” We respond, “Intuition.”

Could we say that all categorical differences between intuitions are nominal and do not denote epistemic primacy? Could we also say that the only thing that gives a non-nominal distinction between intuitions is its content? What about its origin? Note: explore the relation between the specific origins of certain intuitions and epistemic privacy.

The notion of truth is intuitive. Just like the “logic-bind” (the logocentric predicament), the “truth-bind,” as Erik and I have called it in the past, can only be broken out of by accepting the fact asserted by the previous sentence.

How do we axiological intuitions? Are they certifications of evaluations? Does that include feelings (e.g., emotions, “green/red” flags, etc.)? If it did, would they prove that you feel or prove that you feel something specifically? (This is a question similarly posed to empirical intuition: does an empirical intuition just prove that you perceive or that you perceive something that is actual?)

Further Questions

Mereology, how do we address it?

Further Notes on Gender

1. Gender is real.

1.1 Critique of gender abolitionism needed.

1.11 Review gender abolition anarchist literature from the anarchist library as needed.

2. Gender is not just a feeling.

2.1 There is no axiology of gender.

3. Nothing can be circular.

3.1 Gender cannot be circularly defined and a definition of gender(s) cannot be circular.

3.2 Gender is either based on physiological characteristics or is intuitive.

3.21 Gender is intuitive.

3.211 The epistemology of intuitions either entails relativism or it does not.

3.2111 The epistemology of intuitions does not entail relativism.

3.2112 Gender cannot be subject to relativism.

3.2113 Gender cannot be subject to social relativism.

3.3 Gender is not a social construct.

4. Gender is phenomenological.

[Think about the fulfillment of an intuition of an entity’s gender]