[vers. 3] The Solution to the Logocentric Predicament
§1: The logocentric predicament, stated and explained
The predicament that the logocentric predicament is, is a predicament not of logic in itself, but of our use of logic. With Henry M. Sheffer, Harvard logician, the logocentric predicament originates and is simply explained,
Just as proof of certain theories in metaphysics is made difficult, if not hopeless, because of the « egocentric » predicament, so the attempt to formulate the foundations of logic is rendered arduous by a corresponding « logocentric » predicament. In order to give an account of logic, we must presuppose and employ logic. (Sheffer, “Principia Mathematica. Whitehead, Alfred North, and Russel, Bertrand,” pp. 227–228)
The issue always arrived at is found in the employment of what one is trying to prove, which, in this case, is the existence of logic and therefore (logically) necessary inferences. Therefore, if there is no use, i.e., employment, there is no predicament. Those means which we use, which we employ, typically, are inferential principles and inferences. Therefore, non-inferential justification gets around the logocentric predicament. Therefore, in order to get past the logocentric predicament, we will have to line out a theory of non-inferential justification that can withstand all skepticism and critique. This is our massive burden to bear, but it is the burden that all philosophers bear, whether they realize it or not. So, in light of all that has just been said, we must start by going through theories of non-inferential justification and identifying that theory that satisfies those conditions lined out above.